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of Interwar Yugoslavia During the Reign of King  
Aleksandar Karađorđević (1921–1934)  
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ABSTRACT  
 
Bearing in mind the Ottoman burden in relations between Turkey and other Balkan 
states, it seems interesting to look at the process of creating the image of Turkey in 
the public discourse of inter-war Yugoslavia according to the newspaper “Politika,” the 
largest, and the most popular newspaper in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
(since 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). It should be remembered that the modern Ser-
bian state, on the basis of which Yugoslavia was founded, was born in the struggle to 
shed Turkish yoke. The narrative about dropping this yoke has become one of the 
cornerstones for building the prestige and the position of the Karađorđević dynasty. 
On the one hand, the government narrative did not forget about the Ottoman yoke; 
on the other, there were made attempts to present Kemalist Turkey as a potentially 
important partner, almost an ally in the Balkans, which parted from the Ottoman her-
itage. 
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Introduction 
 
In the 1920s, there was a very popular statement among Yugoslav political 
commentators to describe the international situation of their country, that 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was surrounded by the problems 
(brige). The appearance of this catchy term resulted from the fact that this 
word is also an acronym that we get from the first letters of the names of all 
neighbours of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—Bulgaria, Romania, 
Italy, Greece, Albania, Hungary and Austria.1 This curiosity and language play 
turned out to be an excellent diagnosis of the young kingdom’s position on 
the international stage. The uncertainty of the existence in the first months 
after the end of the Great War and the smaller or larger territorial disputes 
between Yugoslavia and almost all its neighbours created the leitmotif of 
the Yugoslavian foreign policy—to watch over the consolidation of the post-
Versailles order in Central and Southeastern Europe.2 It was intended to 
achieve this goal in two ways. The first was to resolve the disputable issues 
with all the neighbours and set up at least correct relations as soon as possi-
ble.3 The second was to strengthen the role of Yugoslavia in the region and to 
make it a leader of this part of Europe.4 To achieve the latter, the Kingdom of 
SCS has taken an active part in two regional alliances: The Little Entente5 and 
the so-called Balkan Entente, known also as the Balkan Pact.6 The anti-
revisionist policy brought Belgrade closer to Czechoslovakia and Romania, 
with which it shared common concerns about the revisionist tendencies of 
Hungary. In addition, Romania and the Kingdom of SCS were even closer to 
keeping Bulgaria in check. The cooperation of these three countries re-
sulted in the creation of the Little Entente block, which perfectly matched the 
French assumptions of creating the anti-Bolshevik cordon sanitaire.7 Possible 
                                                 
1 D. Djokić, Nikola Pašić and Ante Trumbić. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
London 2010, p. 81. 
2 A. Mitrović, Spoljnopolitička doktrina novostvorene jugoslovenske države, [in:] Politički 
život Jugoslavije 1914–1945, ur. A. Acković, Beograd 1973, p. 317. 
3 Б. Димитријевић, С. Сретеновић, Спољна политика Краљевине СХС/Југославије 
1918–1941, „Историја 20. века” 2008, 2, p. 53. 
4 Ibidem; Б. Глигоријевић, Краљ Александар Карађорђевић, књ. III, Београд 2010, p. 9. 
5 About the Little Entente see i.e.: D. Bober, Rola i miejsce Jugosławii w polityce Małej En-
tenty (1920–1938), Poznań 1981 [unpublished PhD dissertation]; M. Vanku, Mala Antanta 
1920–1938, Titovo Užice 1969. 
6 About the so-called Balkan Entente see i.e.: Ž. Avramovski, Balkanska Antanta (1934–
1940), Beograd 1986. 
7 Б. Димитријевић, С. Сретеновић, op. cit., pp. 53–54. 
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cooperation with France was to guarantee the support in the confrontation 
with Italy, the growing power of which was feared in Belgrade and in Paris.8 In 
the 1920s the fear of the expansionist policy of Italy was one of the few factors 
that brought Yugoslavia and Turkey together.9 Nevertheless, it was the idea of 
pan-Balkan cooperation in the spirit of the slogan “Balkans for the Balkan peo-
ples,” propagated from the beginning of the 1930s, which led to closer political 
ties with Turkey.10 This does not mean, of course, that Turkey was ignored 
by the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the 1930s. There is no doubt, 
however, that it initially played a secondary role. It was no different with 
the place and significance of the Kingdom of SCS in Turkey's foreign policy. 
For obvious reasons, until 1923, in the international arena, Turkey focused 
primarily on the war with Greece and maintaining the direction of reforms 
begun by Kemal Mustafa Pasha, the future Atatürk (“the Father of Turks”). 
The situation changed after the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923 
and the Republic of Turkey obtained international legitimacy. After 1923, 
there can be distinguished two phases in the foreign policy of interwar Turkey. 
In the first one, in the years 1923–1932, Turkish rulers focused mainly on 
strengthening the position after the Lausanne Treaty.11 For this reason, in the 
1920s, the Balkans, and consequently Yugoslavia, played the peripheral role in 
the policy of Turkey which focused mainly on the Middle East.12 The situation 
changed at the beginning of the 1930s when Turkey began to strengthen its 
position in the Balkans and became one of the most involved promoters of 
the idea of Balkan cooperation. It is this Balkan vector that allows to distinguish 
the second phase of Turkish interwar foreign policy, the phase of increased 
diplomatic activity in the Balkans in the years 1932–1939.13 
Taking the above into account and bearing in mind the Ottoman burden 
in relations between Turkey and other Balkan states, it seems interesting to 
look at the process of creating the image of Turkey in the public discourse of 
inter-war Yugoslavia. It should be remembered that the modern Serbian state, 
on the basis of which Yugoslavia was founded, was born in the struggle to shed 
Turkish yoke, initiated by the first Serbian uprising in 1804 headed by Đorđe 
                                                 
8 A. Mitrović, op. cit., p. 322. 
9 D. Barlas, A. Vlašić, The Balkan Entente in Turkish–Yugoslav relations (1934–41): The Yu-
goslav Perspective, “Middle Eastern Studies” 2016, Vol. 52, No. 6, p. 1012. 
10 Although it should be noted that both the above-mentioned slogan and the idea of pan-
Balkan cooperation are much older, and its roots can be traced back to the 19th century. 
11 J. Paszkiewicz, Uwarunkowania geopolityczne bałkańskiej polityki Turcji w latach 20. 
i 30. XX wieku, „Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia” 2014, t. XXI, p. 187.  
12 Ibidem, p. 188. 
13 Ibidem, p. 187. 
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Petrović, known as Karađorđe, and finished with the London Treaty of 1913, 
which ended the First Balkan War. The narrative about dropping this yoke has 
become one of the cornerstones for building the prestige and the position of 
the Karađorđević dynasty. The great victory of Serbian arms over the Turks at 
the Battle of Kumanovo (October 23–24, 1912) contributed to the creation of 
the myth strengthening the political position of King Aleksandar Karađorđević, 
who was commanding in this battle.14 Therefore, the issue of presenting the 
image of Turkey in the public discourse of interwar Yugoslavia seems to be all 
the more interesting. On the one hand, the government narrative did not for-
get about the Ottoman yoke; on the other, there were made attempts to 
present Kemalist Turkey as a potentially important partner, almost an ally in 
the Balkans, which parted from the Ottoman heritage. 
 
Press and the Press System in the Interwar Yugoslavia  
in the Service of Royal Policy 
 
The most important medium actually allowing to make such acrobatics and 
create such an image in the mass consciousness of the Yugoslav society was 
still the press. In the first half of the twentieth century, it was still the most 
popular and definitely most accessible medium of information, which could 
significantly affect the public opinion’s perception of current political events. 
The Vidovdan Constitution15 has left many loopholes allowing for the control 
and censorship of the press, although the article 13th of this Basic Law guaran-
teed that the press was free. The same paragraph specifies, however, that it is 
forbidden to publish and disseminate the newspapers and the articles that 
would offend the state authorities, members of the royal family, leaders of 
other states and Skupština—Serbian parliament. It also forbade the titles that 
would publish content, calling on the citizens to forcefully overthrow and 
change the constitution or other laws, as well as calls for the violation of public 
morality.16 The Law of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the Pro-
tection of Public Security and Order in the State (Zakon Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata 
i Slovenaca o zaštiti javne bezbednosti i poretka u državi) published on August 
                                                 
14 More about the so-called myth of Kumanovo, see: P. Michalak, Bitwa pod Kumanowem 
na łamach gazety „Politika” – mit umacniający pozycję polityczną króla Aleksandra Karadjor-
djevicia, „Balcanica Posnaniensia” 2012, t. XIX, pp. 169–179. 
15 The Vidovdan Constitution, was the first constituion of Kingdom of Serbs Croats and 
Slovenes, which was named after the St. Vitus Day (Serbo-Croat: Vidovdan) June 28, 1921, 
when it was enacted. 
16 Устав Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца од 28. Јуна, 1921 год., Београд 1921, 
p. 5.  
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2, 1921, clarified that one of the types of crimes prosecuted under the penal 
code were, among others, press crimes, understood as writing, publishing, 
printing and disseminating books, newspapers, posters or announcements 
which called for overthrowing the elected state authorities, or openly threat-
ened public peace and order. 
The press act of August 6, 1925 was also far from liberal.17 Although it offi-
cially maintained the freedom and independence of the press (article 1.) and 
did not allow the creation of a censoring institution outside the constitutional 
war and emergency time (article 2.), a few of its provisions affected—if not 
directly, then indirectly—freedom of speech and media. One of them was arti-
cle 7., which assumed that before distribution, every freshly printed number 
should be delivered in five copies to the local representative of the authorities, 
who sent one copy to the National Library in Belgrade, University Library in 
Zagreb, National High School Library in Ljubljana, and the public library located 
in the region where the newspaper was published.18 Such a warrant made it 
possible to get acquainted with the newspaper’s content by the government 
representatives even before it was released for sale, which naturally allowed 
for the public interference in the published content. This type of censorship can 
be confirmed by numerous reports of local authorities, and police, including 
complaints, denunciations, and even clippings of articles, or entire numbers of 
newspapers of various types, both journals and rarely published periodicals, 
collected in the documents of the State Protection Department (Odeljenje 
za Državnu Zaštitu) in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes.19 The reports informing about the subsequent articles of 
the press titles that were not favourable to the authorities, suggesting a closer 
look at them to extend censorship, were not uncommon.20 
What is more, article 19. of that Press Law contained a list of offenses, 
the committing of which made it possible to block any publication. These were 
the texts: offending the King and the royal family, the parliament, the texts 
openly calling for the change of the current constitution and the law by force, 
and those insulting public morality. It was also possible to forbid publishing 
                                                 
17 „Службене новине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца” 1925, г. VII, бр. 179 – 
XXXIX (8 август), pp. 1–10. 
18 Ibidem, p. 2. 
19 See i.e.: Arhiv Jugoslavije (further AJ), 14 – 25 – 64, 14 – 65 – 204, 14 – 65 – 205, 14 – 65 
– 206, 14 – 77 – 275, 14 – 78 – 113, 14 – 78 – 296, 14 – 78 – 297, 14 – 78 – 305, 14 – 78 – 309, 
14 – 78 – 311. 
20 One of many examples could be a report on the weekly newspaper “Borba” sent on 
February 2, 1926 to the Headquarters of the Drinska Division in Valjevo, see: AJ, 14 – 78 – 
113. 
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the newspapers accused of spreading hatred against the state and hostility on 
“tribal” grounds, i.e. national or religious, as well as indirectly calling on citizens 
for a forceful change in the constitution or state law.21 The importance of 
the press and the awareness of the role it plays in shaping the society could be 
proven by the fact, that one of the first laws established by King Aleksandar 
I after the introduction of his dictatorship on January 6, 1929, was related 
the new press law. Announced on the same day, it was far more restrictive 
than—already rigorous—the press law from August 6, 1925.22 
As it could be seen, the Yugoslav authorities were very concerned about the 
possibility of influencing and controlling the media message in the public dis-
course. An additional instrument, which allowed King Aleksandar I to control 
the press was the Central Press-Bureau (Centralni Presbiro – CPB), established 
on April 18, 1929. It was one of the first institutions of that kind in Europe.23 
The Chief of the Central Press-Bureau was an official with the rank of the 
deputy minister, directly reporting to the prime minister.24 The importance of 
this institution may be proven by the fact, that its first director was Toni Šlegl 
the former director of the Zagreb daily “Novosti” and a close friend of King 
Aleksandar I. Unfortunately, he was shot just after taking this office.25 The next 
Chiefs of CPB were successive: Milan Marjanović, Milan Nikolić, Teofilo Dju-
rović, Kosta Luković, Boško Bogdanović, Predrag Milojević, and Milorad Rado-
vanović. The length of their term of office was not strictly specified, that is why 
they were elected and removed from the office according to the vision of the 
government which currently was in power. The activities of CPB were divided 
into four sections: the national press, the foreign press, radio, and administra-
tion. The employees of these departments prepared daily reports about the 
articles appearing in both domestic and foreign press.26 Each banovina27 had 
                                                 
21 „Службене новине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца”, г. VII – 1925 (8. Август), 
бр. 179 – XXXIX, p. 3. 
22 I. Dobrivojević, Državna represija u doba diktature kralja Aleksandra 1929–1935, 
Beograd 2006, p. 301. 
23 Закон о Централном Пресбироу, AJ, 38–1–1, p. 1. 
24 Организација штампе и пропаганде у Југославији, AJ, 38–1–1, p. 1; B. Simić, In the 
Spirit of National Ideology. Organization of State Propaganda in Eastern and Southern Europe 
in the 1930s, Comparative Perspectives of Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Beograd 2013, 
p. 61. 
25 B. Simić, In the Spirit of National Ideology…, op. cit., p. 61. 
26 Ibidem, pp. 60–61; Б. Симић, Агенција „Авала”, „Зборник Матице српске заисто-
рију” 2007, бр. 75–76, pp. 79–83. 
27 Banovina was an administrative unit of the internal division in the Kingdom of Yu-
goslavia introduced by King Aleksandar in 1929. 
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its own CPB section, which monitored the activities of the local press.28 All the 
articles attacking King Aleksandar I, his family and government, or opposing 
his policy were blocked. Therefore, when defending their own interests, the 
publishers of most newspapers, including the major ones, such as “Politika,” 
“Vreme,” and “Pravda,” decided to introduce a certain kind of preventive cen-
sorship, resigning in some sense from the position of editors in chief to become 
the censors from the CPB, but thanks to that fact they avoided possible financial 
losses, which could have resulted from banning the publication of a single issue 
or even the whole newspaper.29 Considering all the above mentioned facts and 
remembering about the 9th paragraph of the press law from 1929, which stated 
that every publisher was obliged to accept and unconditionally publish each 
note given him by the authorities in an upcoming issue, the conclusion could be 
drawn that in the political situation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia almost every 
article printed in legally publishing press had to be more or less in line with the 
political vision of government, and thus also the vision of the King Aleksandar I. 
Therefore, it is worth examining how the image of Turkey and the evolution 
in Turkish-Yugoslav relations was presented and commented in Yugoslav in-
terwar press during the reign of King Aleksandar I. The perfect example that 
fits these assumptions is the daily “Politika,” the largest, and the most popular 
newspaper in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929 the King-
dom of Yugoslavia). This newspaper can be considered as a specific mirror, 
which reflected the King’s political concepts and thus also his policy towards 
Turkey. The newspaper was founded by Vladislav Ribnikar on January 25, 
1904, in Belgrade. It was one of the oldest and most prestigious daily in the 
Balkans. During the reign of the King Aleksandar I (1921–1934), “Politika” was 
regarded as the most opinion-forming newspaper in the Kingdom. In the late 
twenties, it was a title with the largest daily print run of approximately 75,000 
copies (the second was “Vreme” with approx. 60,000 copies and the third 
“Pravda” with approx. 25,000 exemplars). Despite the widely proclaimed polit-
ical neutrality, “Politika” almost always supported the official political line of 
the King and the government.30 On the one hand, it was probably determined 
by the economic pragmatism and the desire to avoid any problems with pub-
lishing a single issue.31 On the other hand, it seems that the personal connec-
                                                 
28 Закон о Централном Пресбироу, AJ, 38–1–1, p. 1–2; B. Simić, In the Spirit of National 
Ideology…, op. cit., p. 64. 
29 М. Симић, Лист „Политика” и његов утицај на ширење демократских идеја у пе-
риоду између два рата, Београд 1987, pp. 120–123. 
30 Ch. A. Nielsen, One State, One Nation, One King: The Dictatorship of King Aleksandar and 
his Yugoslav Project 1929–1935, Columbia University 2002 [unpublished PhD dissertation]. 
31 М. Симић, op. cit., pp. 119–123. 
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tions of the part of journalists with the royal court also played the role. Milan 
Gavrilović, considered as the main personage of “Politika” in the period 1924–
1930, may be regarded as an example of such a relationship. Gavrilović was 
a member of the Agrarian Party (Zemljoradnička Stranka) and had quite exten-
sive contacts with military elites. What is more, King Aleksandar’s Marshal of 
the Court, general Aleksandar Dimitrijević was his friend from the youth.32 
Even Henryk Malgomme, Polish charge d’affaires in Belgrade, spoke about the 
high probability that “Politika” published the articles inspired by the govern-
ment circles. He mentioned it in his report from September 18, 1929, dedicated 
to the military convention of the Little Entente.33 Even if we assume that 
“Politika,” as the other major Yugoslav newspaper, did everything to keep even 
just a sham of independence, the result of this struggle was rather poor, which 
was confirmed by the political opposition, who stated that if someone wants to 
find out what actually happens in the Kingdom, they should not read “Politika” 
and “Vreme” but rather German, English and even the Italian press.34 And 
although the question of objective presentation of the internal situation of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia in e.g. the Italian press can also be doubtful, the fact of 
using this fairly drastic comparison may confirm how much native Yugoslav 
newspapers (even the most prestigious ones) were subordinated to the main 
political line of the King and the ruling circles. The above mentioned reasons 
allowed to conclude that such important issues in the Yugoslav foreign policy 
like relations with Turkey should have found its place on the sheets of the most 
frequently read newspaper in the country, which would in some way prepare 
the public opinion for the upcoming changes and justify the royal policy toward 
the post-ottoman epigone. 
 
Turks Know the Serbs and Value Their Spirit.  
The Image of Turkey in Public Discourse of Interwar Yugoslavia  
During the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations in the 1920s 
 
The joining of Turkey to the First World War on the side of the Central States in 
1914 led to the termination of the diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of 
Serbia, which was still strained after the Balkan Wars.35 However, at the begin-
                                                 
32 Ibidem, p. 120. 
33 AAN, Poselstwo RP w Belgradzie, 469, vol. 101, 18.09.1928, p. 89. 
34 I. Dobrivojević, Cenzura u doba šestojanuarskog režima kralja Aleksandra, „Istorija XX. 
veka” 2005, 2, p. 54. 
35 Д. Тодоровић, Питање упостављања дипломатских односа између Краљевине 
Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца и Републике Турске (1923–1925), „Balcanica” 1973, T. IV, p. 265. 
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ning of the 1920s, the governments of both countries probed the possibility of 
starting a peaceful coexistence. The case was complex because of fact that the 
peace treaty signed in Sèvres on August 10, 1920, was basically a dead letter of 
law in the face of the overthrowing of the Sultanate and the seizure of power 
in Turkey by Mustafa Kamal Pasha, who officially broke off the treaty. Due to 
the fact that until winning the war against Greece in 1922 the Kemalist au-
thorities were generally not recognized by any major country in the world, 
in the first 5 years after the First World War (1918–1923) Turkey was on the 
sidelines of the activities of Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The already mentioned international Conference in Lausanne, which began 
its proceedings on November 20, 1922, turned out to be the breakthrough 
point in the Yugoslav-Turkish relations. Already four days after its launch, 
“Politika” has published the interview of the head of the Turkish Foreign Min-
istry Ismet Pasha with his Yugoslav counterpart Momčilo Ninčić, in which the 
former categorically denied that Turkey would interfere in the internal situa-
tion of the Kingdom of SCS and led propaganda among the Muslim population 
of the Kingdom.36 It is worth emphasizing that one of the main fears of Yu-
goslavia in the context of the relations with Turkey, was potential Turkish 
impact on Turks and Albanians from the so-called Southern Serbia (that’s mean 
Macedonia, Kosovo, and Sanjak of Novi Pazar) who until the First Balkan War 
of 1912 were living in the Ottoman Empire and whose loyalty towards Yu-
goslav state were questioned.37 That is why the Yugoslav authorities decided to 
take action to remove 200,000 Muslims of Southern Serbia from the country.38 
Finally, under the Yugoslav-Turkish Convention of July 11, 1938, the govern-
ment in Ankara undertook to adopt 40,000 Muslim Turkish families from 
Southern Serbia in the next six years.39 It should be noted, however, that Mus-
lims in interwar Yugoslavia were not a homogeneous organism and while 
someone could raise some doubts regarding the loyalty of the parts of inhab-
itants of Southern Serbia, Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina found them-
selves fairly quickly in the new realities and Yugoslav Muslim Organization40 
                                                 
36 „Политика” 1922, бр. 5240 (24.11), p. 3. 
37 V. Jovanović, Iseljavanje Muslimana iz Vardarske Banovine, [in:] Pisati istoriju Jugo-
slavije: viđenje srpskog faktora, ur. M. Bjelajac, M. Obradović, V. Jovanović, Beograd 2007, 
p. 98. 
38 V. Jovanović, In Search of Homeland: Muslim Migration from Yugoslavia to Turkey 1918–
1941, “Токови историје” 2008, 1–2, p. 63. 
39 Ibidem, p. 64 
40 More about Yugoslav Muslim Organization see i.e.: A. Purivatra, Jugoslavenska Musli-
manska Organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, Sarajevo 1977. 
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(founded in Sarajevo in February 1919) headed by Mehmed Spaho,41 has be-
come an inseparable part of the Yugoslav political landscape. 
Nevertheless “Politika’s” narrative line of that time created the image of 
Yugoslavia as the leader of the Balkan states’ block in the rivalry with Turkey. 
An interesting example reflecting the political line of the Yugoslav Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in relation to Turkey and the entire region was the article 
by journalist Andra Milosavljević on the proceedings at the conference. In the 
article Balkan block in Lausanne (Balkanski blok u Lozani), published on No-
vember 24, 1922,42 he presented the speech by Minister Ninčić during a work-
ing meeting of the representatives of the Balkan countries organized by the 
Yugoslav delegation, just before the special commission dealing with the access 
of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea started its proceedings.43 The meeting was at-
tended by the representatives of the Balkan states. The Kingdom of SCS was 
represented by Momčilo Ninčić, Greece by Elefterios Venizelos, Romania by 
Ion G. Duca, and Bulgaria by Aleksandar Stamboliyski. Andra Milosavljević 
reported with a fervent triumphalism that under the leadership of the Yugoslav 
delegation, the Balkan Christian countries took one front against Turkey. Dur-
ing the meeting, Ninčić presented the concept of expanding the neutral zone 
overseen by the Entente forces in Western Thrace (on the Bulgarian-Turkish 
border on both sides of the Marica River) by 20–30 km. This solution—accord-
ing to the head of the Yugoslavian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—had to provide 
Bulgaria with access to the Aegean Sea.44 In this way—said Andra Milosav-
ljević—nine years after the battle over Bregalnica,45 the representatives of 
the Balkan states cooperated on the matters whose effects will affect the fu-
ture of the entire Balkans. “My country is not directly involved in this dispute—
said Ninčić—but this dispute concerns my country because it will affect peace 
and stabilize the whole region.”46 According to Milosavljević, it was possible to 
get the impression that the Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs spoke not only 
on behalf of the Kingdom of SCS but the entire region. His speech and argumen-
                                                 
41 More about Mehmed Spaho see i.e.: H. Kamberović, Mehmed Spaho (1883–1939). Poli-
tička biografija, Sarajevo 2009. 
42 „Политика”, 1922, бр. 5240 (24.11), p. 3. 
43 J. Paszkiewicz, Grecja a bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe na Bałkanach 1923–1936, Po-
znań 2012, p. 114. 
44 “Политика” 1922, бр. 5240 (24.11), p. 3. 
45 It was one of the main battles of the Second Balkan War, which took place from June 30 
to July 9, 1913. Bulgarians on one and the combined Serbian-Montenegrin forces on the other 
side stood in the battle against each other. Despite similar losses, the strategic victory was for 
the Serbs and Montenegrins, who forced the Bulgarians to move to the defensive. 
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tation had a huge impact on all, and the whole meeting highlighted the soli-
darity of all the Balkan states.47 However, it should be emphasized that during 
the entire conference Ninčić was very careful that all postulates of Yugoslavia 
would be heard (mainly to ensure the repayment of war reparations by Tur-
key), but in general the attitude of Yugoslav delegation towards Ankara was 
neither negative nor aggressive. Both the head of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, and probably King Aleksandar were keen 
to prepare the soil for the future Yugoslav-Turkish cooperation.48 The first 
attempts were made at the turn of May and June 1923, when a representative 
of Turkey Caved Bey came to Belgrade from Bucharest. The Turkish diplomat 
was supposed to check out the possibilities of establishing diplomatic rela-
tions.49 Although the official activities of diplomacy of both countries had to 
wait, through this visit both sides indirectly acknowledged the existence of 
their own countries in the international arena.50 Eventually, the Treaty of Lau-
sanne was approved on July 24, 1923. He revised the Treaty of Sevres and 
eventually restored Turkey’s outposts in the Balkans (Eastern Thrace, Gallipoli) 
and brought the international legitimacy of the governments of Atatürk and 
the Republic of Turkey (proclaimed finally on October 29, 1923). During the 
deliberations, France played a very important role because it wanted to draw 
Turkey into its Balkan policy.51 
The next two years brought a certain stoppage in the Balkan politics of Tur-
key, but 1925 saw one of the breakthroughs. In May that year, the first repre-
sentative of France after the First World War arrived to Turkey. In February 
1926 an agreement regarding the Syrian-Turkish border was signed, which 
improved further relations on the Ankara-Paris line because it should be 
remembered that Syria was a French protectorate which secured the interests 
of France in the Middle East.52 It also seems that France exerted some pressure 
on Yugoslavia in order to reach Turkey as soon as possible.53 
Despite the Ninčić’s declarations on the willingness to reach the agreement 
with Turkey as soon as possible, the negotiations began to get complicated. 
The more robust Turkey was no longer willing to make concessions to the 
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Kingdom of SCS, both in terms of accepting Muslim displaced persons from 
Southern Serbia and to satisfy the Ottoman debt and reparations owed to 
Serbia after the Balkan Wars. The denser atmosphere can be immediately seen 
in press publications. It was probably not a coincidence that at this time “Poli-
tika” started to publish more articles criticizing and accusing Kemalist Turkey 
of fuelling the idea of Pan-Islamism among the Muslim inhabitants of Macedo-
nia, which Ankara could use for its own interests.54 An example of such anti-
Turkish rhetoric was an anonymous article published on July 11, 1925,55 
entitled: In Kemal’s Turkey (U Kemaljovog Turskoj), with a meaningful subtitle: 
Hatred of Turks against Serbian [sic!] brothers in Turkey. The author of this text 
described the adventures of an unidentified citizen of Yugoslavia who was to 
be persecuted by local authorities for no reason from the very beginning of 
the journey through Turkey. Immediately after his arrival he was arrested for 
6 hours and after leaving the prison he was allegedly followed by a local police 
officer. The visit was only to confirm the very unfavourable attitude of the 
Turks towards the Yugoslavs, which was also noticed by several other Yugosla-
vian Muslims who decided to go to Kemalist Turkey.56 This country has be-
come—according to the words of that traveller—a nationalist and chauvinist 
state. It is impossible to clearly determine the reasons for the publication of this 
text. Perhaps it was aimed at responding to the pressure from the French and 
emphasizing that the Yugoslav resentment towards the Turks is still alive and 
the authorities would be very easily able to explain to the nation why the freez-
ing of relations with the Ottoman successors took place. It cannot be ruled out 
that it was a form of putting pressure on Turkey, because only a month later on 
August 24, 1925, an official representative of Turkey arrived to Belgrade and 
submitted credentials. Even before coming to Yugoslavia, the representatives 
of Ankara assured that there were no formal contraindications to finding an 
agreement between the two countries and that Turkey would accept the dis-
placed Turkish persons from Yugoslavia, under the condition that they sell 
their property (land) so that they could have their own capital necessary to 
settle in Turkey. The government in Ankara wanted to avoid the troubles en-
countered during the reception of the displaced persons from Greece.57 
After such declarations, the tone of the Yugoslavian side also began to be 
more conciliatory, which was also reflected in the press publications. It could 
be seen i.e. in the article published on August 25, 1925, in “Politika,” entitled 
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Turkey’s Representative in Belgrade [Predstavnik Turske u Beogradu], in which 
the journalists informed about the arrival of the deputy and summed up the 
event by stating that the Yugoslav authorities want to sign a peace treaty as 
soon as possible, once the problems between the two countries can be solved.58 
However, in this case, no one mentioned the problem of resettlements but 
rather the reparations from 1913 in the context of the damage done by the 
Ottoman army in Southern Serbia, which at the time seemed a less controver-
sial problem. Finally, the Yugoslavian-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was signed 
on October 28, 1925, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was the 
second Balkan state after Bulgaria (October 18, 1925) with which Kemalist 
Turkey signed such an agreement.59 The treaty was ratified at the end of the 
year, and the symbol of the tightening of the relations between the Kingdom of 
SCS and Turkey was the visit of the head of the Turkish diplomacy Tevfik Rüştü 
Aras in Belgrade on December 24–26, 1925.60 Journalists of “Politika” referred 
to this visit with a perceptible dose of sympathy, which was also visible in the 
interview with the Turkish Minister. In a conversation published in the issue of 
December 25, 1925, the journalists cited a statement of a Turkish politician 
who stressed that: “We [Turkey] are interested in the Balkan matters compre-
hensively as a whole, but we have no conflicting interests here with the King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” In addition, Tevfik Rüştü Aras stressed that 
Yugoslavia was particularly close to Turkey, because the Turks: “[...] know the 
Serbs and value their spirit.”61 The politician also stressed that just like Turkey 
in the Middle East, the Kingdom of SCS in the Balkans is a power that can pro-
tect order and peace and that is why they should cooperate with each other.62 
It is worth emphasizing that this article is a rare case of a positive message 
coming from a narrative about the centuries-old relationship between Serbia 
and the Ottoman Empire. This time, journalists did not emphasize the “Turkish 
yoke” but quoted Tevfik Rüştü Aras’s statement, which meaning was contained 
in, among others this experience of the Ottoman administration in the terri-
tories of Serbia. Much more often, however, the Ottoman legacy’s image in the 
articles published in “Politika” had negative connotations. 
A great example of this are the articles devoted to the anniversaries of his-
torical events, such as the Balkan Wars, or the already mentioned battle of Ku-
manovo (October 23–24, 1912), which were the cornerstone of the narrative 
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uniting the new Yugoslav reality. Obviously, one of the main motives of such 
a narrative must have been to emphasize the fact of overthrowing the Ottoman 
captivity, which somehow imposed the narrative about the interwar Turkey. 
King Aleksandar and his father Peter were presented as the liberators of Serbs 
and Yugoslavs from the Turkish yoke, and the continuators of the great prede-
cessor, Đorđe Petrović, the leader of the first Serbian uprising, which began the 
Serbian struggle for liberation from Ottoman Turkey.63 As “Politika” wrote, 
they cut off the chains of slavery that bound the nation.64 In the articles devoted 
to these events, “Politika” frequently quoted the phrase about the Turkish yoke 
and displayed the events from Kumanovo as the opening of a new era in Ser-
bian/Yugoslav history.65 All this has somehow strengthened the image of Ot-
toman Turkey as the tormentor. These events were presented in “Politika” 
from the very beginning of the King’s Aleksandar reign. 
However, it is worth mentioning that there were some derogations of this 
rule, i.e. in years 1925, 1929, 1933 and 1934 when “Politika” did not place on 
its sheets any information about the celebration of the following anniversary of 
the battle of Kumanovo.66 It seems that the lack of articles devoted to these 
events resulted from both the multitude of important circumstances in the 
internal policy of the state, which caught the attention of the journalists of 
the Belgrade journal more than historical memories, as well as from the then 
relations of the Yugoslavia and Republic of Turkey. In October 1925, both coun-
tries signed the said treaty of friendship. In 1929, the authorities focused 
mainly on strengthening the foundations of the royal dictatorship introduced 
on January 6. In turn, in early October 1933, King Aleksandar made a private 
trip to Turkey, where he personally talked with Atatürk about the idea of creat-
ing the Balkan Entente. In October 1934 it was only eight months since Roma-
nia, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey signed the Balkan Pact. At the beginning of 
this month, King Aleksandar was assassinated in Marseilles. 
As it could be seen in each of the years discussed above, the circumstances 
in internal politics and in Yugoslav-Turkish relations required a positive mes-
sage. It seems, therefore, that it was not a coincidence that in those years 
the editorial office of “Politika” decided to keep silent about the celebrations of 
the anniversary of the battle of Kumanovo. In this situation, Turkey was seen 
as a close ally, so it certainly was not a good time to recall the difficult history of 
mutual relations, and the narrative about the battle of Kumanovo was impossi-
ble to separate from this burden. 
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Pax Balcanica.  
The Image of Turkey in the Public Discourse of Yugoslavia  
During the Period of Creation the Pan-Balkan Cooperation 
 
As it was already mentioned, the beginning of the 1930s was a turning point in 
the activity of Turkish diplomacy in the Balkans, and thus in Turkish-Yugoslav 
relations. Greater activity of Turkey in this area resulted, among others, from 
the fact that as a result of the “great crisis” the powers withdrew from more 
involved activities in this part of Europe, thus creating a space for the action for 
Turkey.67 The beginning of the third decade of the twentieth century favoured 
tightening the ties in the Balkans. The Balkan states have convinced themselves 
that the Republic of Turkey has in fact dissociated itself from the heritage of 
the Ottoman Empire and has no revisionist tendencies. In addition, when the 
situation inside the country strengthened, it began to be recognized by the 
other Balkan states as an important player in the region, cooperation with 
which could bring both political and economic benefits.68 The Turkish-Greek 
agreement of October 30, 1930, was tangible and symbolic evidence of a break-
through. It showed that if even the recent rivals were able to overcome the 
controversy in the most complex issues, the cooperation with Turkey was pos-
sible for every other Balkan state.69 Behind-the-scenes diplomatic activities 
during the Balkan conferences were also not without significance for warming 
up the image of Turkey and improving the relations with the Balkan states, 
including Yugoslavia.70 The last factor influencing the enhanced activity of Tur-
key in the Balkans in the 1930s, which is worth mentioning, was the growing 
sympathy and respect towards Atatürk. In the interwar Yugoslavia, the keen 
relations between King Aleksandar and Kemal Pasha favoured the father of 
the Turks. Its sources should be sought in a similar understanding of interests 
in the Balkan foreign policy of both countries, in a similar conception for the 
construction of a centralist state of a homogeneous nation (both Turkish and 
Yugoslav), but above all in the mutual respect of the rulers for their own mili-
tary achievements.71 The respect which King Aleksandar had for Kemal was 
mentioned by Ivan Meštrović, in his memoirs about a dinner which took place 
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in Zagreb on December 18, 1933. During one of the conversations, when some-
one called Atatürk an interesting man, the King of Yugoslavia said in response 
that Kemal was more than interesting and that for Turkey he turned out to be 
as important as Peter the Great was for Russia. King Aleksandar also empha-
sized that an agreement between him and the President of Turkey was very 
quickly established. He noted that the ruler of Turkey was a man with broad 
horizons, which was to be confirmed by showing respect for the historical 
legacy of Hagia Sophia, including its Christian heritage. At the planned change 
of the mosque into the Museum, Atatürk announced the scratching of plasters 
and the unveiling of some frescoes and mosaics. In addition to these, the King of 
Yugoslavia also underlined the understanding of Mustafa Kemal for the idea of 
the Balkan Pact and the necessity of attracting Bulgaria to it, in order to prevent 
the Bulgarians from falling into Mussolini’s embrace.72 It was not a secret that 
in the interwar period Italy was constantly striving to take control of Yugoslav 
Dalmatia. For this reason, one of the issues of Italian foreign policy was the 
creation of an anti-Yugoslav bloc, which attempted to involve not only revision-
ist states of the region like Bulgaria, Hungary, or Austria but also Turkey and 
Greece in a certain period of time.73 
The warmer Yugoslav-Turkish relations in the early 1930s did not escape 
the attention of the Polish representatives in Belgrade. Although they were 
generally aware of the difficulties in building the consensus between the 
Balkan states and highlighted the difficulties between individual countries in 
the relations with Bulgaria or Albania,74 the improving relations between Yu-
goslavia and Turkey were not overlooked. In one of the reports, it was noticed 
that in the “Balkan Week” organized by Turkey on May 21–26, 1932 in Istan-
bul, which was devoted to industrial and commercial matters, among the in-
vited representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia, 
only Athens and Belgrade governments sent they envoys. This situation—
emphasized in the report—perfectly highlighted the actual state of relations 
between the Balkan states and indicated which of them were in fact interested 
in broadly understood issues included under the general name “Union Balka-
nique.”75 
There is no doubt that 1933 was one of the most important points in Yu-
goslav-Turkish relations during the interwar period. It was that year in October 
that the unofficial trip of the Yugoslav royal couple to Istanbul took place 
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(October 4, 1933). During this travel, King Aleksandar was seeking Kemal’s 
support for the creation of the Balkan Pact and the incorporation of Bulgaria 
into it. According to Branko Lazarević, a representative of Yugoslavia in Turkey, 
this visit turned out to be the new opening in the relations between the two 
countries.76 What is more, according to general Aleksandar Dimitrijević, it was 
this visit that improved mutual relations of the leaders of both countries to 
such an extent that it strengthened cooperation and accelerated efforts to sign 
the Balkan Pact.77 In turn, the result of this new opening was the signing of 
a non-aggression and friendship pact on November 26, 1933,78 during the trip 
of the head of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Belgrade. That break-
through found its response among the broad masses of the Yugoslav society, 
so it could not escape the attention of the media, including “Politika,” whose 
journalists referred to both events. 
The famous tour of King Aleksandar, who was one of the main proponents 
of the creation of the so-called Balkan Entente, in late September and the first 
days of October 1933, during which he visited all potential signatories of the 
pact (not only Turkey, but also Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece), met with great 
interest and was widely and favorably depicted in “Politika.”79 The issues from 
October 4, 5, and 6, reported on the course of visit to Turkey. The journalists 
emphasized the openness, warm and cordial welcome of the King Aleksandar 
and his wife Queen Maria by the Turkish social and political elite, as well as by 
Atatürk himself. The titles of the articles commenting on this unofficial trip of 
the King in the Balkans perfectly reflect the moods that were to be strength-
ened by the medial discourse. The titles of some articles such as: The New Era 
in the Balkans? [Nova Evropa na Balkanu?], or Pax Balcanica. Balkan Nations 
for Balkans [Pax Balcanica. Balkanski narodi Balkanu] speak for themselves.80 
It should be emphasized, however, that this enthusiasm of the Turkish and 
Yugoslav public opinion was not the invention of propaganda detached from 
reality. In the reports of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such infor-
mation can also be found. The diplomats emphasized the epoch-making signifi-
cance of King Aleksandar’s visit to Turkey, during which Turkish society wel-
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comed the Yugoslav ruler with optimism. This trip confirmed the rightness of 
the political direction in which Turkey and Yugoslavia were heading together, 
led by Atatürk and King Aleksandar.81 
The King’s visit to Istanbul was just a prelude to even more important 
events that took place on November 1933. It was on 26 of that month that 
Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, came to Belgrade to 
meet with Bogoljub Jevtić, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of King-
dom of Yugoslavia, a day later and sign a peace and non-aggression pact on 
behalf of Turkey. The editorial staff of “Politika,” of course, did not remain pas-
sive about these events. On November 26, it noted the arrival of the Turkish 
minister, and the day later it published an interview with him, whose main 
point was to emphasize that the Turkish-Yugoslav pact is transparent and will 
serve to guarantee peace and harmony not only in the Balkans but also 
throughout the whole international arena.82 However, it seems that the com-
mentary written by Andra Milosavljević, one of Politika’s most important 
commentators on international politics, was much more important. The article 
entitled Today’s Friendship Pact with Turkey Was Prepared 11 Years Ago [Da-
našnji pakt prijateljstva sa Turskom pripremljen je još pre 11 godina] was pub-
lished as the main text of the issue on November 27, 1933, so at the time when 
the treaty was signed. In his text, Milosavljević stated that the pact with Turkey 
was prepared already 11 years before when after the Greek defeat in Asia 
Minor, King Aleksandar refused the British government, which attempted to 
obtain the Kingdom of SCS in order to seize the Black Sea Straits and Istanbul. 
The ruler of the Kingdom stated that all disputes with Turkey had already been 
resolved on the battlefield in 1912. According Milosavljević such an answer 
was the best example of the manifestation of friendly relations with Turkey.83 
Bearing in mind the overtones of the articles published even at the time of the 
peace conference in Lausanne, which, although not anti-Turkish in its meaning, 
were far from the texts of a somewhat conciliatory nature, it is impossible not 
to see the inspiration of the Turkish royal government policy. 
An apogee of presenting Turkey in a favourable light on the pages of 
“Politika” and the proof of a significant change in the presentation of this state 
in the public discourse were articles accompanying the finalization of negotia-
tions and the signing of the Balkan Pact on February 4, 1934. The idea of creat-
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ing the so-called Balkan Entente, which was supposed to guarantee the protec-
tion of Balkan countries’ interests, was at the same time the assumption of the 
increasingly popular concept of collective security, expressed in the Briand-
Kellogg Pact of 1929.84 Agreed finally on February 4, 1934, and signed on Feb-
ruary 9 of the same year, the Balkan Pact assumed the international coopera-
tion and protection of interests of its signatories: Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, 
and Turkey.85 
The daily reported in details on the course of the last preparatory talks be-
fore the signing of the pact, which took place in Belgrade (February 3–4, 1934) 
and the very ceremony of signing the agreement in Athens (February 9, 
1934).86 A perfect complement to the narrative of “Politika,” which strength-
ened the message about the significance of the Balkan Pact’s significance for 
the security of the state were two caricatures published at that time in the Bel-
grade daily. 
 
 
Image 1: Балкан и Европа, „Политика” 1934, бр. 9240 (4.02), p. 2, 
[online] http://www.digitalna.nb.rs/wb/NBS/novine/politika/ 
1934/02/04#page/1/mode/1up [accessed: 30.04.2019]. 
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The first of them, entitled The Balkans and Europe [Balkan i Evropa], pub-
lished on February 4, 1934,87 presented the conversation of the god of war and 
the angel of peace, who met at the crossroads, one of which led to Belgrade, 
the other to Geneva. In the picture, the god of war resting on the road says 
to the angel: “Hey, you little, you forgot the mask against poisonous gases.” 
He replied: “I will not need it because I am going to the Balkans, where the air is 
much purer than in the cultural West.”88 
The second caricature published on February 9, 1934, that is, on the day of 
signing the pact,89 presents the debate at two different conference tables. 
At the first one there are fatigued and distressed “European diplomats,” one of 
whom states: “Gentlemen, we cannot allow for the balkanization of Europe.” 
At the second table there are happy and smiling “Balkan diplomats” (from 
the left there are heads of Foreign Ministry of the countries—respectively: 
Greece—Dimitros Maximos, Romania—Nicolae Titulescu, Turkey—Tevfik 
Rüştü Aras, and Yugoslavia—Bogoljub Jevtić, and the other two chairs are wait-
ing for the representatives of Bulgaria and Albania), among whom someone 
could hear the voice: “Gentlemen, we cannot allow for the Europeanisation of 
the Balkans,” it is difficult to present the main idea of the pact—“Balkans for 
the Balkan nations”—more accurately. It is also worth noting that this type of 
representation of the relationship between Yugoslavia and the rest of the 
Balkan states, including Turkey, was an unquestionable breakthrough. 
 
 
Image 2: „Политика”, 1934, бр. 9245 (09.02), p. 1, 
[online] http://www.digitalna.nb.rs/wb/NBS/novine/politika/ 
1934/02/09#page/0/mode/1up [accessed: 30.04.2019]. 
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The greatness of the breakthrough is perfectly demonstrated by the fact 
that the Balkan Pact, which included the agreement with Turkey—one of the 
main spiritus movens of the whole idea—was presented in the opposition to the 
relations with the rotten west. It is obvious that the adoption of such a narra-
tive was politically inspired, but there was no doubt that had it not been for 
systematic work on redefining this narrative about Turkey, such a solution 
would probably have been impossible. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The First World War, leading to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, ended 
almost 500 years of Turkish domination in the Balkans. However, it began the 
process of De-Ottomanisation, which could be observed both in Turkey itself 
and in the newly created Balkan countries. It should be noted, however, that 
creating the image of Turkey and Turks in the public discourse of interwar 
Yugoslavia proceeded in two ways. On the one hand, it operated according to 
a well-known pattern of De-Ottomanisation quoted, among others by Maria 
Todorova, according to which the Turks were presented as representatives of 
a foreign, completely different, barbaric civilization,90 and almost all the com-
memoration of the anniversary of liberation from the Turkish rule (such as 
the battle of Kumanovo) was presented as dropping the Turkish yoke and 
the return to Western European civilization. On the other hand, it seems that 
the state authorities were watching over the way in which public discourse 
showed relations with Kemalist Turkey and tried not to take the burden of the 
history of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. It seems that Yugoslav politicians who 
created the foreign policy of Yugoslavia turned out to be political realists who, 
in the early 1920s, in the period of the Greek-Turkish war, appreciated the 
political, social, and economic potential of Turkey. Therefore, in principle, since 
the first years of the existence of both countries, they were careful that the 
difficult relations of the past do not close the door to possible agreement and 
cooperation. 
This is perfectly evident in “Politika,” which together with the tightening of 
the ties between the two countries more and more sparingly emphasized this 
Ottoman yoke, under which the Yugoslavians had to function for almost half 
a millennium, more willingly publishing the articles referring to contemporary 
relations with optimism. The change in the attitude towards Turkey and the 
Turks in the interwar Yugoslav public discourse is best proven by the articles 
                                                 
90 M. Todorova, The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans, [in:] Imperial Legacy—The Ottoman 
Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, ed. L. C. Brown, New York 1996, p. 71. 
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published in “Politika” four years after the death of King Aleksandar. In an arti-
cle published three days after the death of Atatürk on November 13, 1938, 
entitled The Historical Figure of Kemal Atatürk [Istorijski lik Kemala Ataturka], 
the author Vasilj Popović wrote straightforwardly that along with the death of 
Kemal Mustafa, one of the most eminent leaders of the Turkish nation, the 
Turkish state and one of the greatest politicians of the Middle East went down 
in history.91 In turn, on November 17, 1938, in the text My First Meeting with 
Kemal Atatürk [Moj prvi susret sa Kemalom Ataturkom], the author—colonel 
Novica B. Rakočević concludes his memories with an eloquent sentence: “Glory 
to the great and immortal genius of Kemal Atatürk.”92 It seems that these 
words are the best proof of to what extent the way of presenting Turkey 
and the Turks changed in the Yugoslav media during the interwar period, dur-
ing and after the reign of King Aleksandar. Certainly, it would be impossible to 
use such words for the leader of the nation of the recent tormentors a decade 
earlier. 
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